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After a schematic overview of approaches to the study of the crimes of the powerful, 
this paper assesses how ethics can provide supplementary tools for the analysis of the 
subject matter. Powerful offenders, in the argument presented below seek justification 
for their conduct through a selective interpretation of classical Western philosophy 
and by adhering to some aspects of canonical political thought. This interpretive 
process is led by the purpose of expanding their social opportunities, including 
opportunities for further offences, while making the latter acceptable to their peers 
and others. The process entails the implicit claim that offences are, in fact, respectful 
of the very norms being violated. 
 
State agents and economic actors  
 
We may isolate the first set of conceptualizations of the crimes of the powerful as 
those arising from the analysis of the state. Particularly focused on violence, these 
conceptualizations see the crimes of the powerful as original foundational events, as 
secular forms of Promethean acts leading to state formation. These acts, it is argued, 
constitute authorized force and amount to law-making violence. They can be 
foundational, when they establish new systems and designate a new authority. But 
they may also amount to law-conserving violence, when they protect the stability of 
systems and reinforce authority (Derrida, 1992; Benjamin, 1996). Tilly’s (1985) work 
is, in this respect, well known for its emphasis on the centrality of direct organized 
force to the process of state-making (Whyte, 2009). The crimes of the powerful, from 
this perspective, give us a picture of how power is formed and distributed within 
society and how such distribution can be altered (Geis and Meier, 1977). Pursuing this 
strand of analysis some scholars have looked at extra-legal activities of the modern 
state and how these can be located within legal-political theory (Sabuktay, 2009), 
while other experts of state crime in general have remarked that the core capitalist 
states remain the greatest source of state-supported harm, violence and injury (Rothe 
and Ross, 2009). 
   It is in contributions pertaining to the economic sphere, and indeed to capitalism, 
that we find the second set of concepts. Re-reading Frank Pearce’s (1976) seminal 
book, one notes that it took the author more than seventy pages before ‘audaciously’ 
introducing the phrase ‘crimes of the powerful’. At stake was the delineation of a 
theoretical paradigm which, while incorporating some elements of the sociology of 
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deviance of the time, intended to decisively supersede it. Hence Pearce’s appreciation 
of labeling theory but also his sustained criticism of Lemert’s analysis of radicalism, 
which according to the latter was represented by ‘structurally marginal people [who] 
cannot influence others through any rational methods but only through propaganda, 
manipulation, infiltration and distortion’ (ibid: 31). Pearce’s radicalism, on the other 
hand, was based on variables and concepts belonging to classical Marxism such as 
mode of production, surplus value and class struggle. Conflict as an explanatory 
variable, therefore, inevitably became paramount for the analysis of the crimes of the 
powerful, in that definitions of crime themselves were deemed the result of battles 
engaged in the legal arena, with more powerful individuals and groups distancing 
themselves from imputations of criminal conduct while attributing them to the 
powerless. Finally, Pearce specified that, after starting his analysis of corporate crime 
within a very legalistic framework, he was forced to progressively move away ‘from 
the confines of positive criminology’, and in analysing crimes of corporation he was 
‘ultimately led to ask fundamental questions about the nature of American and the 
world’s free enterprise system’ (ibid: 105).  
   To be sure, the work produced on the subject matter throughout the 1970s into the 
1990s built on the solid foundations laid down by Sutherland (1983), who described 
corporations as recidivist offenders and concluded that disadvantage as well as 
privilege may instigate learning processes leading to crime. In the last analysis, 
looking at the social damage caused by corporate actors, it is legitimate to wonder 
why the focus on conventional crime historically adopted by criminology is still 
prevailing.  
  
Anomie, control and techniques of neutralization 
 
Supplementing approaches centred on state formation or focused on economic 
variables, are perspectives inspired by criminological theory itself. Anomie and 
control theory, for example, have both been mobilized to explain the crimes of the 
powerful. The former may posit that the settings in which the elite operates are 
already largely normless, thus encouraging experimental conducts and allowing for 
the arbitrary expansion of practices. Passas (2009: 153), for instance, argues that 
pressure to attain goals are constantly experienced by people in the upper social 
reaches, and that, therefore, ‘they are far from immune to pressures towards 
deviance’. Control theory, in its turn, has suggested that that a number of 
characteristics belonging to offenders may explain all types of crimes, be these 
committed by powerful or powerless individuals. Such characteristics include 
physical as well as psychological traits ranging from impulsivity and recklessness to 
the incapacity to delay gratification and a propensity to blame others first and oneself 
last (Gotfredson and Hirschi). Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralization appear 
to lend themselves ideally to explanatory efforts addressed to the crimes of the 
powerful. For instance, such techniques may be used to deny that powerful offenders 
cause harm or victimize specifically identifiable subjects, to claim that other conducts 
are far more harmful than those one adopts, or that in any case whatever conduct one 
adopts this expresses a form of loyalty to one’s social group and, therefore, cannot be 
deemed criminal.  
 
Organizations and their members 
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An important strand of analysis focuses mainly on micro-sociological aspects, for 
example observing the dynamics guiding the behaviour of organizations and their 
members. As organizations become more complex, responsibilities are decentralized, 
while their human components find themselves inhabiting an increasingly opaque 
environment in which the goals to pursue and the modalities through which one is 
expected to pursue them become vague and negotiable. Organizations may be 
‘mechanistic’ or ‘organic’, the former operating in conditions of relative stability, the 
latter adapting themselves to changing conditions (Burns, 1963). Illegal practices may 
be the outcome of such changing conditions, as organizations are required to 
incessantly devise new ways of reaching their ends and, consequently, to innovate by 
reinventing or violating rules. Organizations, on the other hand, are composed of 
individuals and groups pursuing their own interests although internal conflicts are 
rarely officially displayed and are hidden behind public images of harmony (Dalton, 
1959; Mouzelis, 1967). Alliances taking shape and dissolving, contingent interests, 
and a permanent antagonistic climate characterize the daily existence of 
organizations, whose goals are as indefinite as is the outcome of the power struggles 
taking place within them. 
   By ‘decoupling themselves’ from their constituent parts organizations attempt to 
meet their goals while operating in a highly unpredictable environment. In this way 
they assume ‘a structure consisting of loosely coupled entities’ (Keane, 1995: 169). 
The different entities keep a relative independence, and a loosely coupled structure 
allows organizations to deal with the vagaries of business. Decoupling, particularly 
encouraged by geographical expansion, mergers and acquisitions, also entails that the 
parent companies dissociate themselves from the practices adopted by their 
subsidiaries or partners. Where such practices are illegal, organizations may therefore 
claim their innocence and invoke ignorance of the type of operations being conducted 
by subsidiaries or partners.     
   In further developments, attempts have been made to merge macro- and micro-
levels of analysis, leading to the growing inclusion in the study of the crimes of the 
powerful of formal and complex organizations. These types of crimes are equated to 
manifestations of ‘situated action’, and explanatory efforts have addressed how 
contextual cultures affect decisions to violate laws (Vaughan, 2007). Cultural rules, it 
is argued, define legitimate goals and determine action and meaning. In the economic 
sphere actors experience a relative autonomy whereby agency determines whether 
obligations to obey the law or to follow business norms justifying violations prevail 
(Aubert, 1956). This is consistent with Sutherland’s (1983) theory of differential 
association, whereby individuals learn within their own professional enclave the 
techniques and the rationalisations necessary to deviate. Organizations and their 
members, however, may not simply follow a rational choice model, but find 
motivation for offending within the uncertain position in which they feel they are 
situated. More than sheer greed or striving for success, offenders experience anxiety 
and ‘fear of falling’ or ‘status panic’, as organizations and their members try to either 
rise, remain the same, or fall in the rank of the organizational system (Vaughan, 
1983). It is within this culture of anxiety and panic that offenders are made to feel 
conformist, rather than deviant, in relation to their own professional setting. 
Offending, in this sense, is not the result of calculated choice, but the routine outcome 
of an organizational culture which tends to normalize deviance.  
   It should be noted that this consideration is far removed from the analytical field of  
‘techniques of neutralization’, the latter indicating that offenders are aware that their 
acts are wrong and try to justify them. On the contrary, when deviance is normalized, 
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the conduct is not seen as wrong, nor is it concealed from other members of the 
organization: ‘it is, in fact, culturally approved and therefore rewarded’ (Vaughan, 
2007: 12).  
    According to this analysis, therefore, violations are encouraged less by the 
‘objective’ dynamics of the free enterprise system than by the contingent economic 
and political conditions. Economic actors may, in fact, be led to offend by their own 
assessment of their immediate financial circumstance, by their forecast of future 
economic development, and by their perception that their acts will be met with 
impunity (Yeager, 2007). In a related analysis both the social power and risk-taking 
attitude of materially privileged classes are pinpointed as crucial variables 
contributing to crime and delinquency. Such classes, moreover, inhabit specific 
generative worlds guided by key cultural elements facilitating criminality: unbridled 
competition, a pervasive sense of arrogance, and an ethic of entitlement. According to 
Shover (2007: 88), these are among the reasons why ‘not only taverns and jails but 
also worlds of privilege and corporate offices can be breeding grounds for 
transgression’. With the variable ‘competition’ we find an echo of previous analyses 
focused on free market economies as criminogenic environments. The variable 
‘arrogance’, in turn, alludes to the confidence accumulated through ‘the habit to give 
orders’ and the insolence gained through the lack of defiant responses. Finally, 
‘entitlement’ implies offenders believing that external forces interfere with their just 
desert, namely their right to pursue wealth without external restraint. ‘What is 
instructive about this is confirmation that an ethos of entitlement can become so 
pervasive among occupational practitioners or organizational managers that it 
becomes taken for granted and erodes willingness to comply with law’ (ibid: 92, my 
italic).  
   The word ethos as used in the quotation above is not merely associated with the 
principles guiding market economies, that is with the maximization of profits or with 
the related justification of self-love provided by Adam Smith. Ethos, here, refers 
precisely to the domain of ethics as drawn by the classics of Western philosophy, to 
the distinction between right and wrong postulated by Plato, Pascal, Hume, Kant, 
Hegel and many others who compose the history of Western thought.  
   In the following pages, a journey through this thought is attempted in order to locate 
the crimes of the powerful within our very philosophical tradition. As I will suggest, 
the crimes of the powerful are both within and without this tradition, while the elite is 
engaged in a permanent attempt to read that tradition in a way that may justify the 
practices it adopts. 
 
Reason and passions 
 
Let us start with the idea of justice. In Plato and Aristotle, justice is mainly an individual 
virtue, which nevertheless only finds complete realization within a human community (Plato, 
1937; 1970; Aristotle, 1934). Injustice, on the other hand, is a vice, and unjust people are said 
to be unhappy and live miserably. One may object that contemporary powerful offenders, 
while unjust, are likely to live well and happily. But a classical objection to the Platonic view 
of justice comes from classical philosophy itself. Glauco, for instance, believes that right and 
wrong are determined by a social contract, namely by conventional collective agreements and 
that the distinction between the two is merely artificial. A just conduct, therefore, may be the 
result of fear of the consequences the violation of a contract entails. Because of the artificial 
nature of the distinction, moreover, one is perfectly entitled to pretend to act justly while 
committing all sorts of injustices, also because the gods are not involved in this conventional 
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human contract and appropriate sacrifices and propitiatory ceremonies will suffice to ensure 
the beneficial divine assistance (De Pascale, 2010). Deceit, in brief, pays even with the gods.  
   The crimes of the powerful sit perfectly at ease within this philosophical reasoning, as 
powerful offenders can claim that the norms they violate are mere conventional prescriptions 
and that, therefore, their conduct cannot be judged as intrinsically unethical. Other classical 
notions, however, are met with implicit rejection by powerful offenders.  
   Justice, as we have seen, is an individual virtue, a personal disposition, but is also referred to 
the collectivity as a whole. Take the Aristotelian distinction. Distributive justice, in his 
argument, implies the sharing of riches, honours and all the other divisible items among those 
enjoying the status of citizens.  Corrective or regulatory justice, on the other hand, governs 
social relationships, and intervenes when equity is to be restored. For example, in the face of 
unacceptable conduct, it weighs the harm produced and re-establishes the previous conditions, 
neutralizing that harm (Aristotle, 1934). Powerful offenders could not be further removed from 
both types of justice, as their offending does not lead to ‘sharing’ the ‘honours and all the other 
divisible items’ with citizens, but rather to their increased polarization. Nor does corrective 
justice affect them, as proven by the wide range of modalities they constantly devise to escape 
it. It could be added that, frequently, they also radically deviate from Plato’s concept of the 
Republic, which ‘belongs to the people’, is not a random agglomerate of individuals, but ‘a 
collective association brought together by the common good’. ‘The law does not consist of 
what is beneficial to the powerful’ (Plato, 1937: 134).  
   It is in relation to this last statement that powerful offenders might develop their defence. 
Thrasymachus contests Plato’s concept of norms as necessary tools to govern and avoid 
anomia, arguing that law is a therapy imposed on subordinates for the interest of those in 
authority. Fearing social disunity, Plato looks for norms ‘to which the master no less than the 
man will submit’ (Gouldner, 1967: 297). By contrast, Thrasymachus, perhaps the first conflict 
theorist in the history of Western thought, affirms that ‘the just is nothing else that the 
advantage of the stronger’  (Plato, 1937: 39). In his view, by legislating, the elite proclaims that 
what is right in the mind and practices of the rulers is also right to the ruled. The crimes of the 
powerful are embedded in this dilemma, namely in the process whereby rules of morality – and 
of law – are socially constructed and enacted.  Such views may vary considerably and 
organizational morality is as variegated as moral theory itself (Yeager, 1995). In brief, 
powerful groups structure their own alternative moral reasoning with a view to finding 
inspiration or justification for their behaviour. In this way they adhere both to Plato, claiming 
that rules are beneficial to all, and to Thrasymachus, in practice implying that rules serve the 
interest of those in authority. 
   Powerful groups and individuals are as concerned as anybody else about how their 
behaviour affects others. Their evaluation of right and wrong, in this respect, may 
follow one of the competing logics, available to everyone, which guide moral 
decision-making. They may follow a consequentialist type of reasoning, thus focusing 
on the outcome of their moral choice, or elaborate deontological arguments, therefore 
focusing on the morality of the means adopted and the normative constraints 
established, irrespective of outcomes. From a consequentialist perspective, ‘noble 
wrong-doing’ is acceptable when aimed at collective beneficial outcomes which could 
not be achieved through rightful conduct (Mendus, 2009). On the other hand, 
deontological arguments do not apply to powerful offenders, who do not believe that 
the means they adopt should reflect conventional morality nor that normative 
constraints are just. By following a consequentialist logic, however, they seem to 
endorse an argument brilliantly elaborated by David Hume (2001), which is worth 
summarizing.  
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   Hume poses the question whether it is by means of our ideas or our ‘impressions’ 
that we distinguish between vice and virtue. Reason in his view is ‘perfectly inert, and 
can never either prevent or produce any action or affection’ (ibid: 399). It is true, 
Hume continues, that reason can influence our conduct, but only in the sense that it 
can excite a passion and teach us how to pursue it. The crimes of the powerful, 
similarly, are not simply determined by reason, but also by the discovery of a cause-
effect mechanism whereby certain acts may be utilized to pursue passion, for example 
in the form of gains. No passion can be termed unreasonable, according to Hume, 
unless it chooses the wrong means to achieve its ends. Here, Hume seems to postulate 
a variant of what in criminology are termed learning theories, namely that 
professional subcultures lead to the realization that certain means will lead to exercise 
one’s passions and, at the same time, to the discovery of yet new potential objects of  
passion. In conclusion, reason can never motivate actions of the will and can never  
oppose passion in the direction of the will: ‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger’ (ibid: 416). Powerful 
offenders may well appropriate this principle and justify their conduct with a 
universal, human need to follow an increasing variety of passions and learn how to 
pursue them in constantly new fashions.  
   The concept of normalization briefly discussed above indicates that it is a specific 
occupational community that designates, in the last analysis, which act committed by 
its members is criminal and which is not. This concept echoes Hume’s argument 
around the origin of our sense of disapprobation. Where does this sense derive from in 
the face, for instance, of a murder?  Not from reason, reiterates Hume, because 
however we examine the fact ‘murder’ we do not find something we are able to 
associate with vice. ‘In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, 
motives, volitions and thoughts; the vice entirely escapes you’ (ibid: 469). You need 
to ‘turn your reflection into your own breast’, and there you will find a sentiment of 
disapprobation arising towards that action. Right and wrong, therefore, are determined 
by feelings, they lie in us, not in external objects or actions. By describing something 
as vicious, we only reveal our own nature and our reaction to events. ‘Vice and virtue, 
therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which are not qualities 
in objects, but perceptions in the mind’ (ibid: 469). Morality, ultimately, can be felt, 
not judged. 
   Powerful offenders find moral support in this analysis of subjectivity proposed by 
Hume, according to whom ‘morality is not susceptible to demonstration’ and moral 
certainty cannot be established with the help of sciences such as ‘geometry or algebra’ 
(ibid: 404). In this sense, the crimes of the powerful escape objective categories and 
qualifications and can only be deemed ‘crimes’ when they arouse a sense of 
revulsion, a passion linked with feelings of justice and injustice. But these feelings, as 
we have seen, would tend to wither away when the crimes of the powerful become 
normalized. 
    Opponents of this line of reasoning are numerous and include Immanuel Kant, 
whose philosophy has not ceased to exert influence on contemporary thinking. Kant’s 
qualification of ‘good’ is closely linked to the notion of ‘good will’, therefore a 
central element of agency persists in his analysis of morality which seems to echo 
Hume’s emphasis on subjectivity. What radically separates the two, however, is the 
relevance they respectively attribute to reason. In Kant, all human qualities, for 
instance intelligence, wit, judgment, ‘and the other talents of the mind’, but also 
courage, resoluteness, and perseverance are, doubtless, good and desirable. ‘But they 
can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts 
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of nature, is not good’ (Kant, 1994: 123). The Kantian will is shaped by reason rather 
than feelings, and ‘moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and calm 
deliberation’ are achieved through logical association of thoughts and practical ideas.  
   Misology, or hatred for reason, arises from the assumption that the more a person is 
cultivated the less she will enjoy life and pursue happiness. Hence a form of envy for 
‘the common run of men who are better guided by mere natural instinct and who do 
not permit their reason much influence on their conduct’ (ibid: 125). For Kant, reason 
is given to us as a practical faculty, one which is meant to have a crucial influence on 
the will. ‘As nature has elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they 
are to perform, reason’s proper function must be to produce a will good in itself’ 
(ibid). The key variable designating good will, however, is a sense of duty. So, for 
instance, in commercial interactions individuals behave in certain ways for the sake of 
their own advantage, and their selfish purpose is devoid of any sense of duty. For 
actions to possess a moral worth, instead, they have to be inspired by a principle of 
volition which transcends ‘the objects of the faculty of desire’ (ibid: 128). Moreover, 
there is in Kant a total coincidence between duty and the law, as ‘the moral worth of 
an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it… the pre-eminent good 
can consist only in the conception of the law itself’ (ibid: 129). 
   Within this analytical framework, powerful offenders would find it hard to justify 
their conduct, unless they claim their propensity towards misology, namely a type of 
unreasonableness that criminologists would associate with lack of self-control 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). On the other hand, a technique of neutralization 
available to them might include the claim that duty and law do not coincide, thus 
reiterating Thrasymachus’s argument about the artificial nature of norms of conduct. 
Their own duty, they may assert, is to maintain stability in the system, irrespective of 
the means utilized, a stability which is guaranteed through the perpetuation or the 
accretion of their power. As for the law, this may well be depicted as an obstacle to 
individual freedom, a cumbersome machinery stifling political and economic 
initiative. Surely, powerful offenders are deeply anti-Kantian, as they see no 
connection between law and duty, nor can they claim ‘moderation in emotions and 
passions, self-control, and calm deliberation’. An option available to them, however, 
is to seek legitimacy through an opportune, self-serving use of Hegel’s arguments on 
morality, to which we will now turn. 
   Hegel (1952: 89) labels Kant’s analysis an example of empty formalism, which 
‘reduces the science of morals to the preaching of duty for duty’s sake’. Moral value, 
in his view, is not an abstract entity, but can only be established in contradiction or in 
correspondence to a principle. For example, if we presuppose that property and 
human life are to exist and be respected, ‘then indeed it is a contradiction to commit 
theft or murder’. Will and duty, therefore, have to be referred to specific principles 
and their contents, otherwise they end up lying on formal, hollow values. Hegel’s 
idea, in brief, is that morality is not simple rectitude in the sense of respect for the 
law, but possesses its own intrinsic value in relation to a specific ‘ethical community’.  
Once such community is taken as a guiding background, the set of norms, duties, 
sensibilities and common understandings that inform it will indicate what is virtuous 
behaviour and what is vice. ‘It is easy to say what man must do, what are the duties he 
has to fulfil in order to be virtuous: he has simply to follow the well-known and 
explicit rules of his own situation’ (ibid: 90). We may conclude, therefore, that 
powerful offenders, once they identify with the ‘actual order’ informing their ‘own 
situation’, can claim that their ‘general mode of conduct’ corresponds to common 
expectations, ‘habitual practice and custom’ (ibid).  
 8 
   Profit maximisation, amoral calculation and commercial competition have been 
thoroughly and originally discussed in relation to the crimes of the powerful, 
particularly in the economic sphere (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). The focus here, 
however, is on philosophical arguments which are able to rescue powerful offenders, 
providing them with subtle justifications for their acts. What we have seen so far is a 
possible use of such arguments which surpasses in effectiveness any technique of 
neutralization identified by criminologists. Hume, Kant and Hegel, of course, are far 
from inciting or justifying immoral conduct, although those who adopt such conduct 
may well purge their conscience by way of arbitrarily interpreting their thoughts. 
These thoughts, on the other hand, lend themselves to the exercise proposed in the 
previous pages, where the effort has been made to unravel what is hidden, nuanced, 
disguised or implicit. Fewer nuances are found, instead, in the thinkers examined 
below, who make explicit references to how immorality can be readily legitimized. In 
Pascal and Machiavelli, as I will try to show, powerful offenders may find what they 
interpret as unambiguous enticements to ethical and normative violations. 
 
From Pascal to Machiavelli 
 
In a broad distinction within ethics, as we have seen, we may identify thinkers who 
judge an act right or wrong in accordance with whether it produces the best 
consequences, and thinkers who judge actions against some pre-established rule or 
principle (Singer, 1994). Blaise Pascal belongs to the former group and clearly 
describes a collective mechanism turning vice into its opposite. He identifies the 
‘marvellous principle, so important in our morality, of directing the intention’  
(Pascal, 1967: 102). According to this principle, intentional actions can be stripped of 
the evil they cause and turned into acceptable acts. In an exemplar case Pascal 
remarks that we do not tolerate those who are determined to sin just for the sake of 
sinning: we find them diabolical. But if we put into practice the method of ‘directing 
the intention’, we may discover that even the action of sinning can be granted a 
virtuous character. When unable to prevent actions we can at least correct the 
viciousness of their means by establishing the purity of their ends.  
 
‘This is how our Fathers have found a way to permit the acts of violence 
commonly practiced in the defence of honour. For it is only a question of 
deflecting ones intention from the desire for vengeance, which is criminal, and 
applying it to the desire to defend one’s honour, which according to our 
Fathers, is lawful’ (ibid: 110). 
 
Pascal’s argument displays some similarity with the political thinking of Niccolò 
Machiavelli, a founding master of consequentialist arguments that are still widely 
endorsed.  
   Machiavelli describes Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who accomplished great 
things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality had no mercy, faith, humanity, or 
integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be influenced by such qualities, would 
have failed to accomplish anything. Telling the story of Agathocles, he concedes that   
‘It cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without 
faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory’ 
(Machiavelli, 1944: 68). Still, he does not see why Agathocles should be esteemed 
less than the most notable and heroic of captains. Wisely, Agathocles caused injuries 
in one stroke, all at one time, thus avoiding the repetitive infliction of harm on a 
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regular basis. Also, he obtained sovereignty without the assistance of the nobles, who 
would have been unmanageable allies, but with the support of the people, and ‘he 
who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around 
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him’ (ibid: 74).  
   After arguing that leaders acting entirely in the name of virtue ‘will be destroyed’, 
he encourages the prince to develop skills in ‘doing wrong and make use of them or 
not according to necessity’. ‘If everything is considered carefully, it will be found that 
something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something 
else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity’ (ibid: 
119). Machiavelli’s acumen is then revealed in this analysis of consensus, which 
under some circumstances we would today describe as populism. It is not true 
therefore that building on the people is like building on mud, he remarks, adding 
some insights as to how even the crimes of the powerful can enjoy some form of 
popular consensus along with practical and ideological support. For example, the 
prince who engages in extra-legal activity, such as ‘pillage, sack, and extortion’, is 
advised to be ‘liberal’, and to handle that which belongs to others with generous 
altruism: a fair distribution of the bounty among his followers is highly 
recommended. Machiavellian powerful offenders, in other words, have to find the 
way of manipulating the variable ‘benefit’ so that the outcomes of their illegality will 
appear to be advantages to others as well as themselves. Examples may be 
entrepreneurs who ignore the rules of fair competition claiming that by doing so they 
safeguard the jobs of their employees; or states which engage in cruelty against 
enemies and dissenters explaining that in this way they ensure the security and safety 
of citizens. This, again, is perfectly consonant with Machiavelli’s teaching, according 
to which the only thing a Prince has to avoid is hatred on the part of his subjects, 
whereas cruelty, by causing fear, increases social cohesion.   
 
Habit, opportunities and trust  
 
Powerful offenders, in the argument presented so far, can find justification for their 
conduct through a selective interpretation of classical philosophy and of some aspects 
of canonic political thought. This interpretive process is led by the purpose of 
expanding their social opportunities while making their conduct acceptable as 
inherited custom. Let us explicate this point.  
   Opportunities define the set of choices available to actors, who can expand their 
own and/or attempt to restrict those of others. Opportunities shape preferences, which 
in their turn shape the pursuit of outcomes through interaction (Hedström and 
Bearman, 2012). The crimes of the powerful constitute interactions aimed at 
expanding the opportunities of the offenders while eroding the possibility of 
collective control and institutional constraint. Being elastic rather than fixed 
(Petersen, 2012), opportunities need not deliver a constant amount of social 
advantage, but may be used as a form of investment granting increasing privileges 
and, simultaneously, neutralizing those social forces which pursue equality. The more 
unequal the distribution of opportunities, the more hopeless the efforts addressed 
towards equality, in an expansionist dynamic which involves power in general along 
with powerful offenders. The concept of normalization fails to capture this 
expansionist logic, as it implies a stationary condition rather than a constantly 
‘evolutionary’ one. Powerful offenders, through their illegal conduct, set ethical 
precedents which are liable to be superseded by yet new illegal conducts, in a process 
involving the permanent evolution of habit.  
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   Moral sense or conscience is said to mark the most important difference between 
humans and the lower animals. ‘This sense has a rightful supremacy over every other 
principle of human action; it is summed up in that short but imperious word “ought”, 
so full of high significance’ (Singer, 1994: 44). The most noble of all attributes of 
humans, this moral sense is acquired and developed through images of past actions 
and motives, it is strengthened by habit and ultimately by the perception that such past 
actions enjoy the positive judgment of the community. There is no divine origin in 
ethics, but a form of ‘community super-ego’ left by persons and actions which 
become exemplary in the imagination of its members. Powerful offenders develop 
their own collective super-ego informing their practices, their views, expectations and 
interactions with others. In this way they attempt to turn meta-ethics into normative 
ethics. The first type of ethics implies judgments external to events and absence from 
the contexts in which events take place.  
 
‘The term meta-ethics implies that we are not taking part in the practice of 
ethics itself, but are reflecting on that practice, as if from a different level from 
which we can view it as a whole, and see what is going on when people are, 
say, arguing about the right and wrong’ (ibid: 10).  
 
At the level of meta-ethics we might ask whether there could possibly be a true or 
correct answer to the questions within ethics. On the other hand, to take part in 
discussions about substantive issues is to engage in normative ethical argument and to 
create arguments qualifying the nature of one’s participation in events. This implies 
choice of values, rules, standards, or principles that should guide our decisions about 
what we ought to do. In this way, powerful offenders isolate their illicit practices from 
meta-ethics, reducing those practices to sheer normative choice.  
   While creating custom and habit, however, powerful offenders have to deal with the variable 
trust. This can be achieved through competence or reliability, for example conveying images of 
inegrity, honesty, and the commitment to do no harm. In this case, trust is cognitive-based, in 
the sense that it stems from past experience that informs us on the likelihood of an individual 
or group to act ethically and live up to their legal obligations (Cook and Gerbasi, 2012). Of 
course, powerful offenders cannot be accorded cognitive trust, as past experiences make them 
untrustworthy. This is compounded by the fact that, normally, it is not easy to grant trust in 
power-asymmetric relationships. The only option for powerful offenders is, therefore, to seek 
‘affective trust’, namely the confidence individuals place in others on the basis of feelings 
generated by interactions with them. This affective trust is a form of ideology and, in our case, 
amounts to offenders convincing other groups and individuals that their interests are the same 
as their own and that all benefit from illegality. Implicit in the creation of affective trust is a 
notion of hegemony and consensus, which preside over the formation of internalized forms of 
cooperation and acceptance.  Power always needs an amalgam of consensus and coercion, 
aiming at building trust and repelling imputation of criminality, in brief at constructing images 
of ‘trusted criminals’ (Friedrichs, 2004). This process may be smoothed by the fact that, 
paradoxically, trust in individuals may decline while trust in the institutions and ideologies 
they represent may not. Simultaneously, trust networks, of cognitive as well as of an affective 
type, ‘can emerge to facilitate social and economic exchange under uncertainty, but can also 
emerge to support corruption and other forms of illegal activity’ (ibid: 232). The crimes of the 
powerful, in this way, become organized and regularized, and due to repeat dealings through 





An ethical interpretation of the crimes of the powerful shows the vagueness of ethics itself and 
illustrates the efforts by offenders to claim philosophical affiliation to this or that aspect of 
classical thinking (Ruggiero, 2012). We have seen how an ambiguous reading of Hume, Kant, 
Hegel, Pascal or Machiavelli may lead to justifications for offending that are potentially much 
more effective than ex-post techniques of neutralization invoked in criminology. We have also 
seen the centrality of consensus, legitimacy and hegemony, as powerful offenders attempt to 
mobilise the complicity or acceptance by other actors, implying that their acts are beneficial to 
others as well as to themselves. By re-directing their intention, as Pascal would have it, they 
try, in other words, to sanctify their choices by establishing the purity of their goals. This 
process may lead offences to become part of custom and habit, in an evolutionary, 
expansionary tendency resulting in new and increasingly harmful illicit conducts.  
   Every justification of authority is based on the fragility of humans, from Hobbes to 
Kant. The former abolishes society and communities, including relationships within 
them, replacing these with pure power relationships, namely between individuals and 
sovereign. The latter regards humans as made of crooked wood, incapable of 
morality, unless constrained by laws. Power, therefore, being the result of human 
fragility, reflects this fragility, being itself like unmanageable crooked wood 
(Esposito, 2006). It would be a mistake, however, to claim that the crimes of the 
powerful can also be deemed the outcome of such fragility. In this paper, the attempt 
has been made to prove that classical ethics may add strength to already strong actors 
and groups. Such groups possess a subjective set of dispositions, a lasting pattern of 
thought, perception, and behaviour which at times overlap with some aspects of 
classical philosophical thought, in a way that makes their deviance appear, in fact, as 
a mode of adhering to that noble tradition of thought. Their habitus, acquired through  
internalization of culture and embodied in a set of practical skills (Vaughan, 2012; 
Bourdieu, 1984; 1990), leads to an enhancement of their position in society: it is a 
habitus that incorporates licit as well as illicit procedures and justifications. 
Ultimately, the crimes of the powerful contribute to the reproduction of the power 
structure in society while seeking ethical neutralization by claiming consonance with 
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